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1 Transport Cost Sharing and Spatial Competition
September, 2003; Revised February 2004
Abstract
We consider a linear city model where both ￿rms and consumers
have to incur transport costs. Following a standard Hotelling (1929)
type framework we analyze a duopoly where ￿rms facing a continuum
of consumers choose locations and prices, with the transportation rate
being linear in distance. From a theoretical point of view such a model
is interesting since mill pricing and uniform delivery pricing arise as
special cases. Given the complex nature of the pro￿tf u n c t i o nf o r
the two-stage transport cost sharing game, we invoke simplifying as-
sumptions and solve for two diﬀerent games. We provide a complete
characterization for the equilibrium of the location game between the
duopolists by removing the price choice from the strategy space. We
then ￿nd that if the two ￿rms are constrained to locate at the same
spot, the resulting price competition leads to a mixed strategy equilib-
rium with discriminatory rationing. In equilibrium both ￿rms always
have positive expected pro￿ts. Finally, we derive a pure strategy equi-
librium for the two-stage game. Results are then compared with the
mill pricing and uniform delivery pricing models.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The spatial competition literature in the Hotelling tradition has two main
strands. One concerns itself with models of mill pricing in which ￿rms
choose location and prices, while the spatially dispersed consumers pay the
cost of travelling to the ￿rm to buy the product. The other strand of the
literature assumes that ￿rms absorb the transport cost of shipping the item
to the consumers and is called uniform delivery pricing since all consumers
pay the same price.1 In this paper we analyze a model of a linear city that
1A third concept, less frequently encountered is that of spatial price discrimination
(Hoover, (1937)). For an insightful exposition of this issue see Anderson, de Palma and
1incorporates features of both mill pricing and uniform delivery pricing. We
assume that ￿rms charge the same price to all consumers but have a cost of
delivering to all those who purchase from them as in the models of uniform
delivery pricing. Buyers on the other hand pay the price and also incur
a transport cost which, for instance, re￿ects the delivery time associated
with the good. This delivery time increases with the consumer￿s distance
from the ￿rm and is a source of disutility. It captures the opportunity cost of
being able to consume sooner than later.2 The consumers￿ share of transport
cost can be interpreted broadly to include time, eﬀort and other transaction
costs, asides from the costs of travel. This feature is common to models
of mill pricing. Thus our model is a hybrid of the standard mill price and
uniform delivery price models.
Buyers and sellers in the real world are dispersed over geographical space.
It has been argued that the dispersed nature of market activities can be a
source of market power for ￿rms. Each ￿rm has only a few rivals in its
immediate neighborhood. Similarly, consumers who are at a considerable
distance from a ￿rm will not buy from that ￿rm since they have to pay
very high transport costs. The relative location of the ￿rms with respect
to the consumers is a crucial determinant of the degree of competition.
Consequently, once one recognizes the importance of space, it is obvious
that competition in the real world occurs only among a few and is best
analyzed in a strategic game setting.
The economic relevance of location games does not stem exclusively from
their initial geographical set-up. The idea can be extended to competition
among ￿rms selling diﬀerentiated products where each ￿rm￿s product is
viewed as a point in the characteristic space. This product diﬀerentiation
aspect of location theory dates back to Hotelling￿s (1929) seminal work. He
recognized that while location was a source of market power in itself, it could
also be a proxy for other characteristics of the product. The following quote
serves to illustrate this point quite well: ￿...distance, as we have used it for
illustration, is only a ￿gurative term for a great congeries of qualities. In-
stead of sellers of an identical commodity separated geographically we might
consider two competing cider merchants side by side, one selling a sweeter
liquid than the other.￿
Aside from the purely theoretical aspects of the model, one encounters
many examples of this sort in the real world. Retailers bear the cost of
Thisse (1989).
2One need look no further than the wide array of shipping options provided to con-
sumers by FedEx, UPS and the United States Postal Service to be convinced of the value
of consuming earlier.
2bringing the commodity over to the shopping center, while the buyers must
drive there to actually inspect and purchase the items. Buying furniture
usually involves a trip to the furniture store and selecting the desired items,
and the furniture store usually delivers the items to the consumer location
free of charge. An almost perfect example is the Chicago based video rental
￿rm Facets Cin· emath‘ eque or Facets Video Rent By Mail. Members can order
videos of their choice by mail. The ￿rm pays shipping and handling one
way, while the consumer incurs the mailing expenses involved in returning
the video. The labor market also has similar features. The commute time to
work has to be borne by the employees. Hence, one consideration for ￿rms
in choosing to locate in the suburbs is the desire to avoid traﬃc congestion
thereby making the job attractive to workers. The large numbers of hi-tech
￿rms located in sub-urban Washington D.C. provide ample testimony to
this fact.
A similar phenomenon can also be observed in certain types of diﬀerenti-
ated product markets. In particular, it is quite common in some segments of
the software industry. Often each ￿rm produces its own standard product
and then customizes it to suit the needs of individual buyers, while buy-
ers have to learn the intricacies of the software. For example, software for
Supply Chain management in the food industry diﬀers from that designed
for the apparel industry (which is equivalent to choosing location) and the
software ￿rm has to tailor the package to suit the needs of individual clients
in each of those industries. The cost of learning new software or customizing
it to suit the individual client￿s needs can be treated as transport cost in
our framework. Also, ￿rms often attempt to reduce their buyers￿ learning
costs by providing training classes, on site implementation and customer
service. This is de￿nitely true for the Electronic Resource Planning [ERP]
segment of the industry where ￿rms like PeopleSoft and SAP constantly
provide training to their clients and have created a new professional class
called information technology consultants.
For the purpose of modelling these issues one might imagine that there
is a total cost for moving a commodity from the store to the consumer￿s
location. We then assume that the total pecuniary burden of shipping a
commodity from the ￿rm to a consumer is shared by both buyers and sell-
ers. So consumers in our model pay an exogenously set proportion of the
transport cost while ￿rms pay the remainder. For most of the examples
listed above, assuming an exogenously given transport cost sharing rule is
reasonable since the consumers have their own transport cost, while ￿rms
have to incur transport costs which are speci￿c to them. Notice that when
the consumers￿ share of costs goes to zero we have the uniform delivery
3price model and when they bear the entire cost we obtain the mill pricing
formulation.
In the subsequent sections we develop a model to analyze the two stage
game. We ￿rst analyze for a pure location game with exogenous prices
and its counter-part where ￿rms locate at the same spot (thereby removing
location choice from the strategy space) and compete in prices. The most
interesting ￿nding for the location game is that when transport costs are
shared, a unique and symmetric equilibrium in locations will exist. We ￿nd
that as the consumers￿ share of the transport cost decreases, both ￿rms move
further away to the center to reduce their transport cost bill. On the other
hand when the exogenously given price in the location game is raised, ￿rms
move towards the center to minimize transport costs. We also ￿nd that
when the two ￿rms are constrained to locate at the same spot, the resulting
price competition leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium with discriminatory
rationing.B o t h￿rms always have positive expected pro￿ts in equilibrium.
Using the insights from these two games, we then model the two stage
location price game. These allow us to simplify the otherwise complex and
intricate expression obtained for the pro￿t function of each ￿rm. We identify
conditions under which the two stage game has a pure strategy equilibrium.
We also demonstrate that Hotelling￿s claim about increasing transport costs
leading to greater pro￿ts is incomplete − properly stated, it must account
for consumer reservation prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
provides a brief overview of the related literature. Section 3 provides the
basic model setup. In Section 4 we solve for the location equilibria, assuming
￿xed prices. Section 5 analyzes a particular price game where both ￿rms
are located at the same spot. The following section solves for the location-
price equilibrium of a two stage game where the two ￿rms ￿rst choose their
locations and then compete in prices. We look for subgame perfect equilibria
in this game. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2 Review of Literature
Given the plethora of work both on models of mill pricing and uniform de-
livery pricing, an exhaustive survey of all aspects of the literature would be
a considerable digression. We limit the scope of our review only to those re-
sults which are pertinent to the model under consideration. Graitson (1982)
is an early survey of the literature. A more up-to date and comprehensive
survey can be found in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992). The litera-
4ture on mill price is more abundant and we will start by discussing those.
The mill price models trace their heritage from the original Hotelling
(1929) model.3 Typically in these models ￿rms choose locations and then
prices and consumers incur the transportation cost. Hotelling ((1929), pg.
53) claimed that under mill pricing the two ￿rms in the market would
￿...crowd together as closely as possible.￿ , while he noted the possibility of
Bertrand competition for the extreme concentration case only.4 Fifty years
later d￿Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) (henceforth DGT) revis-
ited the model and formally characterized the ￿awed nature of Hotelling￿s
solution.5 They found that the price equilibrium found by Hotelling holds
only if the two ￿rms are suﬃciently far apart. If the two ￿rms were located
close to each other, undercutting the opponent is pro￿table. Higher pro￿ts
destroy the pure strategy equilibrium in prices. Consequently, ￿nding the
location equilibrium for the two stage game is also jeopardized. Of course
as pointed out by Hotelling, when the two ￿rms are exogenously located at
the same spot, the game reduces to pure Bertrand competition. What he
missed though (and was pointed out by DGT), was that price undercutting
or Bertrand competition would arise ￿earlier￿ − long before the ￿rms ￿arrived￿
at the same location. The tendency to undercut which allows the success-
ful ￿rm to capture the entire market would arise as soon as the ￿rms are
suﬃciently close. DGT suggest one way out of the nonexistence problem:
assume quadratic transport costs. The game now exhibits a ￿centrifugal￿
location tendency rather than central location tendency. The ￿rms would
like to locate outside the linear city, and hence in equilibrium the two ￿rms
charge the same price and locate at the endpoints of the line segment.
There are also some other approaches to deal with the non-existence
problem. One of the more ingenious ones by de Palma et al. (1986) shows
the existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies by introducing suﬃ-
ciently heterogenous products. A diﬀerent solution has been provided by
Kats (1995) where the linear city was replaced by a one dimensional bounded
space without boundary, i.e., a circle. In this case a pure strategy equilib-
3Note however that Ferreira and Thisse (1996) provide evidence of the fact Launhardt
had already proposed such a model of a spatial duopoly in 1885.
4In the industrial organization literature this result is also referred to as the principle
of minimum diﬀerentiation. The term was coined by Boulding (1955) who used it among
other things to explain the existence of similarities between Methodists, Quakers and
Baptists.
5As noted in Osborne and Pitchik (1987), Vickrey (1964) had already identi￿ed the
problem with Hotelling￿s analysis.
5rium does exist − any pair of locations where the ￿rms are at least a quarter
away from each other and p∗
1 = 1
2 = p∗
2 constitutes a pure strategy equilib-
rium. Another approach is to characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium.
This line of research stems from the two Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) pa-
pers on games with discontinuous payoﬀs guaranteeing the existence of an
equilibrium in Hotelling type models. Osborne and Pitchik (1987) under-
take the task of actually identifying the equilibrium mixed strategy price
distribution functions of Hotelling￿s original model. They identify a support
for mixed strategies in prices when the ￿rms locate close to each other. They
￿nd a unique pure strategy equilibrium in locations, in which the ￿rms are
located at about 0.27 from the respective endpoints. For those locations, the
equilibrium support for prices consists of two distinct line segments. As an
intuitive explanation Osborne and Pitchik suggest a parallel with the phe-
nomenon of ￿sales￿. It is worth emphasizing that during this analysis they
encounter highly nonlinear equations and resort to computational methods
to come up with approximate numbers.
For the uniform delivery pricing models, where each ￿rm quotes a single
delivery price to all its customers, the non-existence problem is even more
severe. It arises because the rationing of some consumers by one ￿rm allows
its rival to service this segment of the market at a high price. This gives
the ￿rst ￿rm an incentive to undercut, thereby destroying the equilibrium
(see Beckmann and Thisse (1986)).6 A comprehensive analysis of the circu-
lar space scenario can be found in Kats and Thisse (1993). After showing
the nonexistence of a pure strategy equilibrium in prices, they invoke Das-
gupta and Maskin (1986) and characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium
in prices. The location equilibrium in the ￿rst stage of the game is in pure
strategies. The second part of their paper is devoted to the endogenous
choice of the pricing policy by the ￿rms. For the monopoly case, uniform
delivery pricing is the optimal policy, partly because it allows the monop-
olist to extract all the surplus from the consumers. In the duopoly case,
the consumer￿s reservation price r is the crucial parameter. For low r<5
8,
both ￿rms choosing uniform delivery pricing is the unique equilibrium of the
pricing policy game. For higher r, the competitive region (the overlapping
market area) for the two ￿rms becomes larger, intensifying price competition
between the ￿rms, making mill pricing quite attractive. Hence both price
policies can be sustained as equilibria for the duopoly with mill pricing re-
6For more on uniform delivery pricing models also see Greenhut and Greenhut (1975)
and de Palma, Portes and Thisse (1987).
6sulting in higher pro￿ts. Another solution to the nonexistence problem also
using heterogenous products can be found in de Palma, Labb· ea n dT h i s s e
(1986). The interested reader may also refer to Anderson, de Palma and
Thisse (1989) for an excellent comparison of the above two pricing poli-
cies, as well as spatial price discrimination using a heterogeneous product
formulation.
3 The Model
Consider a linear city of length l with a continuum of consumers distributed
uniformly on this line. Each consumer derives a surplus from consumption
(gross of price and transportation costs) denoted by V . In keeping with
the terminology used in the spatial competition literature we will refer to
this as the consumer￿s reservation price. Consumers are assumed to have
unit demands when their reservation value exceeds the price plus the trans-
port cost they incur. Otherwise, they do not purchase the commodity. The
transportation rate t is assumed to be linear in distance. Consumers pay
a proportion α and ￿rms pay a proportion (1 − α)o ft h et r a n s p o r tc o s t .
Consequently, a consumer who travels a distance of d pays αtd as transport
cost and the ￿rm pays the remaining (1 − α)td of the cost. For notational
c o n v e n i e n c ew es e t( 1− α)t = s and αt = t − s. Due to the sharing of
transport costs by consumers and ￿rms, consumers face horizontal product
diﬀerentiation and ￿rms engage in some price discrimination in our model.
There are two ￿rms in the market called A and B.T h e ￿rms are located
at respective distances a and b f r o mt h ee n d so ft h el i n e( a + b ≤ l, a ≥ 0,
b ≥ 0), and charge prices of p1 and p2 respectively. In order to focus on the
transport cost issue, we assume that there are zero marginal costs. Utility
maximizing consumers buy from the ￿rm that quotes the smallest eﬀective
price (mill price plus their share of the transport cost). The location of the
indiﬀerent customer is denoted by z =
p2−p1
2(t−s) + 1
2(l − b + a). Firms in the
model ￿rst choose a location and then quote a price. Based on the price and
the transport cost consumers make their purchase decision. Figure 1 (all
￿gures have been attached at the end) represents the most general situation,
i.e., the two stage location-price game and provides a graphical depiction of
the notation developed here.
We are now in a position to obtain the pro￿t function of the two stage
game. Note that the expression below is derived for ￿rm A. We require that
a ≤ l−b,o rt h a t￿rm A is located to the left of ￿rm B.F o rt h e￿rm on the
7right, a symmetric expression applies with only relevant change in notation.
Set


























































P =( t − s)(l − b − a).
Then the general expression for the pro￿t function is as follows:
Π1(p1,p 2,a,b)=

       
       




2∆2 + Φ • p1 − s
2Φ2 + Γ • p2 − s
2Γ2 if p1 >p 2 + P;
(ii) H • p1 − s
2H2 + K • p1 − s
2K2 if |p1 − p2| ≤ P;
(iii) M • p1 − s
2M2 + K • p1 − s
2K2 if p1 <p 2 − P.
Notice that the expression depends on the relationship between the price
diﬀerence p1 − p2 and P =( t − s)(l − b − a) ,t h ec o s tt oac o n s u m e rt o
go the extra way from a to b. Further, observe that if the ￿rm serves an
adjacent market area (an interval immediately to its left or to its right) of
length N, then the revenue from these customers is N • p1 and the cost of
serving them is s
2 •N2. It remains to determine that ∆,Φ,...are the correct
market sizes. We will explain the ￿rst component of the pro￿t function in
detail and provide brief discussions of the last two cases.
(i) p1 >p 2 +( t − s)(l − b − a). This case occurs when ￿rm A is being
undercut by ￿rm B.H e r e∆ i st h es i z eo ft h em a r k e ta r e at ot h el e f to fi t s
location and Φ is the size of the market area to the right of its location. We
now discuss each part in some detail.
Consider {p1−s•max[0,a−(b−
p2
s )]} ￿rst. This is part of the expression
for revenue. As noted above, if the ￿rm were to serve an adjacent market
8area, the revenue would be p1 times the base, ∆.H o w e v e r , i t i s p o s s i b l e
that the low price ￿rm, by undercutting, is serving part of the market to
t h el e f to f￿rm A￿s location. This would correspond to the case when in the
expression max[0,a−(b−
p2
s )] the greater number is a− (b−
p2
s ). Here the
height of the rectangle representing revenues would be less than p1 by the
amount s • max[0,a− (b −
p2
s )].
Next consider ∆ in more detail. The part max{0,l− b −
p2
s } within ∆
represents situations where depending on parameters ￿rm B￿s left hand side





t−s }} allows for the fact that the eﬀective right hand side boundary
will be determined by the minimum of a and the left hand side bound of
￿rm B￿s market segment as determined by the preceding expression. Now
consider max{0,a− V −P1
t−s ,a−
p1
s }. This depicts the possibility that ￿rm A
may not serve to all the customers to the left of a. It depends on whether
the ￿rm A￿s constraint through price and transport cost is binding or the
consumer￿s reservation price constraint goes into eﬀect ￿rst. The diﬀerence
∆ is the total market area available to ￿rm A to the left of a.
We now move on to Φ.T h et e r mm a x {a,l −b−
p2
s } inside Φ represents
the possible right-hand side bounds on ￿rm A￿s market area depending on
the price and transport cost that ￿rm B has to incur. Intuitively, by under-
cutting, ￿rm B captures ￿rm A￿s territory and the parameters determine
the limits of ￿rm A￿s market area. The l − b −
p2
s expression here repre-
sents the case when the ￿rm B￿s transport cost determines the limits of its
territory. Taking the maximum of this expression and a ensures that we
con￿ne ourselves to considering market segments to the right of ￿rm A￿s
location. The next term a +
V −p1
t−s represents the case when given ￿rm A￿s
price, customers￿ decision about whether to buy from this ￿rm determines
its market area. Since both numbers, i.e., max{a,l − b −
p2
s } and a +
V −p1
t−s
represent possible bounds on the right hand side for ￿rm A, the smallest of
them is the eﬀective bound. This accounts for the ￿min￿ in the expression.
F i n a l l y ,s i n c ew ea r ec o n s i d e r i n go n l yt h er i g h th a n ds i d em a r k e ta r e a ,w e
need to subtract a from this expression.
The last two terms represent the possible case of ￿leapfrogging￿ a far
away market: Γ is a possible market area to the right of the opponent￿s
territory. It occurs when the opponent loses market share from the right,
thus making it feasible for the left-hand side ￿rm to serve that chunk of the




t−s } part of
Γ represents the possible right-hand side boundary of that market segment.
It could be either l (the right-hand side boundary of our linear city), or a
9bound arising either because the seller is unwilling to sell or the buyers do
not wish to purchase on the far right hand side area of the linear city. The
term max{a,(b +
p2
s )} represents the possible left-hand side boundary for
that market segment. The maximum of zero and the above has to be taken,
to account for the possibility that the right hand side border of ￿rm B￿s





(ii) |p1−p2| ≤ (t−s)(l−b−a). In this case no ￿rm is able to undercut its
rival. The ￿rst two terms here signify pro￿ts from the right hand side and
t h el a s tt w ot e r m ss i g n i f yp r o ￿t sf r o mt h el e f th a n ds i d e .H is the minimum
of the three following possibilities: either the line segment between a and
location of the indiﬀerent consumer, or
p1
s which is total the market the
￿rm A would like to serve (on its right hand side), or only the line segment
representing the locations of those consumers (located to the right of a)
who would like to buy from ￿rm A. Since this is the no undercutting case,
the (left-hand side) extent of the market area to which ￿rm B is willing to
sell plays no role here. The expression K just depicts the ￿rm A￿s captive
market on the left hand side.
(iii) p1 <p 2−(t−s)(l−b−a). This case occurs when ￿rm A undercuts
￿rm B.T h e￿rst two terms are pro￿ts from the market area of size M on
the right and the last two are pro￿ts from the market area of size K on the
left. Consider M.F i r mA can sell to the market segment it wishes to, given
by
p1
s , unless of course some of those customers themselves do not want to
purchase from it which is given by (
V −p1
t−s ). Finally, it allows for the fact
that ￿rm A sells to the entire line segment, from its own location a up to
the right hand side boundary of the linear space, l.T h el a s tt w ot e r m so f
this part of the pro￿t function represent the market area of the ￿rm to the
left of its location.
The general expression for the pro￿t function given below indicates a
host of possibilities from which one may surmise that multiple equilibria
can exist in our setting. Clearly, it will not be possible to analyze the model
without making some simplifying assumptions. Any equilibrium outcome of
the model will be determined by the interplay of the consumer￿s reservation
value and the ￿rm￿s choice of location and prices. Since our model combines
elements from both the mill pricing and the uniform delivery pricing models,
absence of sales can occur for two reasons. First, consumers may not wish
to purchase the product at the price oﬀered by the ￿rm because of low
reservation utilities. Secondly, for certain location-price pairs, it is also
10possible that a ￿rm may not want to sell to some consumers who are willing
to buy from it. Keeping these in mind we analyze two diﬀerent games to gain
some insight into the two-stage game. We ￿rst study a pure location game.
Here V does not play any role and we are able to focus on the interaction
between price and location choice. We then look at the situation where the
￿rms are located at the same spot. In this case choice location does not play
a role and allows us to concentrate on the interaction between V and the
prices set by the ￿rm. Finally, in the two stage game all three parameters
are allowed to vary.
4T h e L o c a t i o n G a m e
In this section we assume that price is exogenously given, as in a regulator￿s
world. This can also happen if prices have been chosen earlier in the distri-
bution channel by manufacturers or wholesalers, and retailers are subject to
resale-price maintenance. In this section we assume that the price set by the
regulator is low enough to ensure that consumers can buy from either ￿rm.7
In order to look for equilibria we de￿ne three price ranges based the ￿rms￿
ability to recover the transport cost of shipping to consumers and identify
the equilibrium for each case. Our ￿rst proposition concerns one of these
ranges.
Proposition 1. If 1
4sl ≤ p ≤ sl, there exists a unique equilibrium in
locations. The equilibrium locations are symmetric and are given by










[40pls − 8p2 − 5(sl)2].
Proof: See Appendix.
In contrast to the original Hotelling model, here transport cost consider-
ations in maximizing pro￿ts prevent the ￿rms from locating at the center in
all instances. Next, in equilibrium the indiﬀerent consumer is always located
at l
2 irrespective of the location of the two ￿rms. Further, a∗ ∈ [ l
4, l
2]w i t h
7We analyze the role of reservation prices in subsequent sections of the paper.
11the ￿r mn e v e rl o c a t i n gt ot h el e f to f l
4 to ensure that cost minimization.
The corresponding pro￿ts lie in the range [2
8pl, 3
8pl]w i t hp r o ￿ts increasing
as the ￿rm A moves to the right. When p ∈ [1
4sl,sl]a sa s s u m e di nt h e
proposition, the optimal location varies inversely with s and directly with
p. Comparative statics results suggest that ￿rms in our model also have
a central location tendency. Clearly, da∗
dp > 0, suggesting that both ￿rms
want to locate closer to the center as the exogenously given price grows. As
the regulator raises the price, each ￿rm can sell to a larger segment of the
market and in order to minimize costs moves towards the centre. Since this
is true for both ￿rms, equilibrium behavior ensures that the position of z
remains unchanged. Finally, using the fact that s =( 1−α)t,i ti sa l s op o s s i -
ble to show that da∗
dα > 0. Thus as the consumers bear a greater proportion
of the transport cost, we get an outcome closer to Hotelling￿s mill pricing
model. This is intuitive since the closer the situation is to Hotelling￿s case,
the stronger is the central location tendency.
Equilibrium location for the remaining two cases cannot be obtained
using standard ￿rst order conditions and is discussed next.
Remark 1. Case (i) p<1
4sl : Prices are so low in this range that the ￿rms
are unable to serve the entire market. At best each ￿rm can only sell to a
market size of l





solve for p. This equation enables us to ￿nd the price at which the market
areas of the two ￿rms are adjacent without overlapping which occurs at
p = 1
4sl. For prices below this the ￿rms can have isolated markets. In fact
the ￿rms will locate such that their market segments do not overlap while
maximizing the market area served. They choose locations so as (1) not to
have overlapping market areas (
p
s < l−b−a
2 ), and (2) to ensure that (p − as)
is nonpositive. Thus, it is possible to have a whole range of locations as
equilibria in this instance.
Remark 2.C a s e( iii) p>s l:H e r ee a c h￿rm can cover the entire market
by itself. Both ￿rms locate at l
2. From the previous proposition we have
already seen that no seller wants to choose a location to the left of their
original location with increases in price. By symmetry of the pro￿t functions
rightward movements are ruled out, as this amounts to relabelling the ￿rms
and therefore both ￿rms choose l
2.
Thus, with a slight modi￿cation of the location game we ￿nd that Bould-
ing￿s ubiquitous principle of minimum diﬀerentiation is no longer so perva-
sive. The implications of this for the regulator are also fairly obvious. If
the regulator decides to lower prices after the ￿rms have chosen locations,
12each ￿rm￿s location will be sub-optimal. Hence, in order to maximize pro￿ts
both ￿rms will deliver to a smaller market than prior to the price reduction.
Similarly, if prices are raised locations will still be sub-optimal, but fewer
c u s t o m e r sw i l lb el e f to u t .W en e x ts o l v ef o rap r i c eg a m ew h e r eb o t h￿rms
are at the same location by decree.
5A S p e c i a l P r i c e G a m e
In this section we analyze a price game when both players are constrained
to be at the same location while retaining all other assumptions of the pre-
vious section. Admittedly, this is an extreme assumption, but it is also the
analogue of the problem in the previous section where the ￿rms faced exoge-
nously given prices and were allowed to compete only in locations.8 Given
that transport cost is shared between the ￿rms and consumers some inter-
esting possibilities can arise in this game. First, for low V some consumers
will not purchase the product at the price oﬀered by the ￿rm. Another pos-
sibility is the existence of prices at which a ￿rm does not sell to some willing
consumers. Then given a suﬃciently high V , the other ￿rm can alter (raise)
its price and sell to the excluded section of the market. Thus, the two ￿rms
may sell the same product to diﬀerent segments of the markets at diﬀerent
prices. Clearly, rationing of certain consumers is a distinct possibility in
this model. Furthermore, this rationing will be of a discriminatory nature,
as each additional consumer will pay a higher eﬀective price based on the
distance from the seller￿s location.
Since both ￿rms are located at the same place, there is no horizontal
product diﬀerentiation − we have a case of pure price competition. As shown
by DGT, in the Hotelling model there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for
such a price subgame where prices are equal to the marginal cost, i.e., zero.
Given positive transport costs for ￿rms however, the standard Hotelling
result no longer holds. We ￿nd that there is no pure strategy equilibrium
in the price subgame. Instead, we show the existence of a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists where prices always exceed the marginal cost. This is
similar to the results in models of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition (see for
example Allen and Hellwig (1986), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), and Kats
and Thisse (1993) in the context of spatial models.
We will ￿rst establish a result about the upper (pu)a n dl o w e r( pl) bounds
on prices. Without loss of generality, consider a realization of the mixed
8One might imagine a situation where fastidious city planners will only let ￿rms set up
shop at a particular location!
13strategy where ￿rm A charges a low price and ￿rm B sets a high price.9
We obtain pu by computing the monopoly price that takes V into account.
Consequently, there are two possible upper bounds on price. When the
reservation price is below a certain threshold (say b V ), at the price upper
bound denoted by pu
r some consumers in the market will not wish to purchase
from ￿rm B.10 When V ≥ b V , the upper bound is given by the highest price
at which ￿rm B can sell to consumers located furthest from it, and is denoted
by pu
a (>p u
r) since the ￿rm sells to all residual consumers.
Lemma 1. The support of any equilibrium in the (same location)
price game is a strict subset of [0,V].
Proof: See Appendix.
The next proposition shows the precise support of this mixed strategy
equilibrium when the ￿rms locate at the center. We then argue that this
can be generalized to asymmetric location choices of the ￿rms.
Proposition 2. For a = b = l
2, the price game has no pure strategy
equilibrium. A mixed strategy equilibrium does exist for this price game. For












and for V ≥ b V ,












We now argue that the same result is also true for any other location of
the two ￿rms. The problem becomes asymmetric in this case and the critical
value of V on the right hand side segment of the ￿rm￿s location can diﬀer
from the critical value on the left hand side. This alters the pro￿ts of the
high price ￿rm and consequently the value of the bounds. Given that the
problem is computationally intensive and qualitatively no diﬀerent from the
one shown above, we just provide the rationale for the argument without
explicitly computing the bounds.
Remark 3. For a + b = l, the price game has no pure strategy equilib-
rium. A mixed strategy equilibrium however, does exist in this price game.
9Although we often refer to ￿rm A as the low price ￿rm and ￿rm B as the high price
￿rm, here we have in mind only a particular realization of the mixed strategy.
10T h ep r e c i s ev a l u eo ft h et h r e s h o l dr e s e r v a tion price is not relevant to the argument
here. Exact computations are shown for the next result.
14To deal with the case of any location, we will consider situations where
a< l
2 and a+b = l, using the rationale suggested above. While the method
for computing the upper and lower bound remains the same, three distinct
possibilities can arise in this situation. Two of these situations have already
been described above (see also Figure 3). The third possibility arises in the
asymmetric case because there is an intermediate value of the reservation
price at which some consumers to the right of a will not be able to purchase
at the monopoly price. This case will also yield diﬀerent values of ph and
pl. Thus we will have three diﬀerent inequalities which have to be solved
using a technique similar to the one used for a = l
2. The main diﬀerence
with the previous case therefore stems from the fact that the computation
of monopoly pro￿ts changes. This aﬀects the high price ￿rm￿s best response
and consequently the lower bound without altering the logic of the calcula-
tion. Since Theorem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) holds in this case as
well, the mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
It is worth pointing out that while the upper bound can be the monopoly
price, the lower bound diﬀers from zero and from s as well. Since s may
be thought of as the marginal cost to the ￿rm of (delivering) an additional
unit, this is diﬀerent from the usual lower bound of the support of the mixed
strategy in rationing models. These diﬀerences arise because the rationing
mechanism in our model can be described as discriminatory rationing.C o n -
sumers not served by the low price ￿rm are served by the high price ￿rm, but
each additional consumer pays a higher eﬀective price which is proportional
to the distance from the ￿rm￿s location. It is precisely this reason which
also prevents the price from going down to zero due to price undercutting,
as it becomes worthwhile for one ￿rm to sell to the market segment that is
left out instead of lowering prices further.
The mixed strategy equilibrium in our formulation has another attractive
feature. Equilibrium pro￿ts in the DGT model are always zero when a+b = l
and involves the play of a pure strategy with both ￿rms choosing zero prices.
In general, a mixed strategy equilibrium is often considered unattractive as
players are indiﬀerent between all the pure strategies involved. Moreover,
it does not give any reason to select among these diﬀerent strategies (see
Osborne and Rubinstein, (1994) for more on interpretations and criticisms
of mixed strategies, including points on which even the authors of the book
disagree). The redeeming feature of the equilibrium mixed strategy in our
model is the fact that expected pro￿ts are always positive, whereas in the
DGT framework they are always zero. In fact, pro￿ts are positive for any
realization of the mixed strategies since pl is always positive in our model.
15The insights from these two special games and their implications for the
two-stage game are discussed in the concluding section.
6T h e L o c a t i o n −Price Game
In this section we will look for pure strategy equilibria of the two stage
game where ￿rms ￿rst choose their locations and then set prices. Figure 1
is a representative situation for this case. The subgame perfect equilibrium
obtained here is the central result of this paper and ties together all the
elements of the last two sections. Given the general setting of this section
multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out. However we focus on identifying
a pure strategy equilibrium.11 This is the most frequently sought after
equilibrium in the spatial competition literature, and is perhaps the most
interesting one as well. Besides being an interior equilibrium we ￿nd that
it also has other intuitive properties. We compare our results with those of
DGT and the uniform delivery price models.
The strategy for constructing the proof is as follows. We identify three
conditions to simplify the pro￿t function for the two stage game and give it
the relevant shape, i.e., one that enables us to ￿nd a pure strategy equilib-
rium − the only one that is ￿strictly interior in all respects￿ for the two stage
game. Then we show that an interior pure strategy equilibrium cannot ex-
ist unless these conditions are satis￿ed, thereby justifying these conditions.
Thus while the constructed equilibrium might seem to require endogenous
conditions, we show that if these conditions do not hold an equilibrium can-
not exist. These conditions essentially allow us to focus on a speci￿cp a r to f
range of the pro￿t function to construct the desired equilibrium.
Condition 1: Buyer Participation condition. This condition consists of
two inequalities and is assumed by most models of spatial competition (see
for example DGT or Graitson￿s (1982) survey).
(i) p1 +m a x {(t − s)(l − a),(t − s)a} <V
(ii) p2 +m a x {(t − s)(l − b),(t − s)b} <V
These inequalities require that the reservation price be so high that con-
sumers are not prevented from buying from either ￿rm. The absence of this
condition will lead to the type of outcomes associated with Case (i) of the
location model described in Section 4.
11Following Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), it can be shown that the pro￿t function
satis￿es conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and is available from
the authors on request.
16Condition 2: Seller Participation condition. All of the four inequalities
given below must be satis￿ed for no ￿rm to lose any market share.
(i) p1 − as ≥ 0a n dp1 − (z − a)s ≥ 0 and,
(ii) p2 − (l − b)s ≥ 0a n dp2 − (l − b − z)s ≥ 0,
where z =
p2−p1+(t−s)(l−b+a)
2(t−s) denotes the location of the indiﬀerent con-
sumer. It ensures that the total cost imposed on each ￿rm by the market
segment both to its left and right hand side can be represented by the area
of a triangle. Essentially it says that the prices are so high that after ac-
counting for costs, the ￿r mi sw i l l i n gt os e l lt oa l lc o n s u m e r sw h ow i s ht o
purchase from it, in its captive market on one side and up to the indiﬀerent
consumer on the other side. Note that this condition has consequences for
both location and price choices and aﬀects the possibility of ￿leapfrogging￿
by ￿rms.
Condition 3: Market Capture condition.
|p1 − p2| < (t − s)(l − b − a)
This is the situation that frequently appears in mill pricing models. It
implies that no single ￿rm can set its price to sell to the entire market by
completely undercutting its rival.12
Next, assuming that Conditions (1) − (3) hold, we have surprisingly well




(2a2 + z2 − 2az)a n d
Π2(p1,p 2)=p2(l − z) −
s
2
(b2 +( l − b)2 + z2 − 2(l − b)z).
This is easy to verify since Condition 3 eliminates a large portion of the
pro￿t function and the other two conditions give us the desired expression.
Region 3 of (Figure 5) depicts a pro￿t function of this sort. We now show
that a (interior) pure strategy equilibrium in prices and locations does not
exist when either Condition 2 or Condition 3 is not satis￿ed.
12Although we call it the Market Capture condition, this is somewhat of a misnomer.
When the ￿rm￿s share of transport costs is high, the ￿rm that undercuts may not choose to
sell to all the customers who wish to purchase from it. Condition 2 prevents the occurence
of this situation.
17Lemma 2. A pure strategy equilibrium of the price-location game
does not exist when the Seller Participation condition does not hold.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 3. A pure strategy equilibrium of price-location game does
not exist when the Market Capture condition is violated.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that in the DGT framework Condition 3 is enough to guarantee
that the pro￿t functions are well-behaved. However, in our framework this
condition does not suﬃce, as the ￿rm that has undercut its rival may not
wish to sell to all the willing consumers. The other ￿rm then will be able
to get the residual consumers. By raising the price ￿rm A is able to reach
the boundary where the customers wish to purchase from it. Note that the
pro￿t function of ￿rm A will have a kink here. Consequently, the pro￿t
function will not be well behaved, which renders it impossible to solve the
two stage game in the standard fashion. However, Conditions (1) − (3)
together whose violation ensures that a pure strategy equilibrium will not
exist enables us to circumvent those sorts of problems for the current anal-
ysis.
De￿ne
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Proposition 3. Suppose Conditions (1) − (3) are satis￿ed. Then
for a + b<l , the tuple (a∗,b ∗,p ∗
1,p ∗
2) as de￿ned above is the unique sym-
metric equilibrium in pure strategies of the location-price game.
Proof: See Appendix.
We are now in a position to compare our results with those of the mill
pricing and uniform delivery pricing models. As demonstrated by DGT, the
18Hotelling model is inherently unstable. Optimal prices require that ￿rms




2)/∂b are positive and both
￿rms have a tendency to move to the center. Thus the Market Capture
condition is violated and the second stage equilibrium does not exist. We
employ a similar reasoning to investigate the existence of our pure strategy
equilibrium. Let Θ =( Π∗
i −Π0
i) > 0w h e r eΠ0
i denotes pro￿ts from capturing
the whole market. We ￿nd that Θ > 0w h e ns>0.5034t suggesting that
￿rms must share more than half of the total transport cost to ensure that
equilibrium pro￿ts are higher than undercutting pro￿t s .T h i si se q u i v a l e n t
to the DGT condition requiring ￿rms to be suﬃciently far enough. In other
words a low s facilitates capturing the market. It becomes easier for the two
￿rms to locate closer to each other which facilitates undercutting.
Note that Θ =0a ts =1 , which coincides with the uniform delivery
pricing case. When s = 1, optimal pro￿ts are the same as those from
undercutting, simply because optimal prices are the same as undercutting
prices: p0
1 = p∗
1−(l−b∗−a∗)(t−s), and at s = t, clearly p0
1 = p∗
1. This can also
be explained intuitively. As s → 1, p∗ → 3
8lt and a∗ = b∗ → 1
8l. Therefore,
the right hand side bound of the desirable market area for ￿rm A given by
a∗ +
p∗
s can be written as 1
8l + 3
8tlt = l
2. Obviously, the desirable market
areas for two ￿rms in this case do not overlap. They are contiguous meeting
at the center of the city. Also, as mentioned earlier, the optimizing price
here is the same as undercutting price. In this situation, each ￿rm has an
incentive to increase its price, provided the buyer participation constraint
is satis￿ed. By doing so the ￿rm looses only an in￿nitesimal amount in
pro￿ts as a result of market loss to the competitor. On the other hand it
gains a larger amount in pro￿ts due to the higher prices. This is the usual
explanation for the non-existence of price equilibria in uniform delivery price
models (see de Palma, Labb· e and Thisse, 1986). Hence, for the case of s =1
or in the uniform delivery price model, there is no pure strategy equilibrium
in prices. Thus, while a mill pricing type situation does not arise unless
the ￿rm share of transport cost is greater than half the total transport cost,
the uniform delivery pricing type situation arises only when ￿r m sp a y st h e
entire cost.
Next we ￿nd that ∂Θ/∂s is a concave function with the maximum at
s ’ 0.7. The concavity of this function can be explained by the fact that
it aﬀects both prices and locations diﬀerently and the value of Θ clearly
depends on which of these two dominates the other. Our model suggests
that diﬀerential pro￿ts are maximized when both ￿rms and consumers incur
a part of the transport cost. This echoes the ￿ndings of Kats and Thisse
(1993) on the issue endogenous pricing policy choice. They ￿nd that for high
19reservation values (as in our model) both mill pricing and uniform delivery
pricing can be sustained here as an equilibrium. It is also worth mentioning
that a special case of Proposition 3 arises when sellers are constrained to
choosing only symmetric locations around the center. In this case we ￿nd
that a = b = l
4, and optimal prices are given by p = l(t − 3
4s).
An intriguing feature of optimal pro￿ts seems to be the fact that pro￿ts
rise with an increasing t.13 This however is fairly intuitive. As the transport
technology becomes more expensive, it becomes easier for the ￿rms to en-
gage in monopolistic behavior. The consumers￿ reservation price must also
increase in order to enable the consumers to purchase the commodity at the
higher eﬀective price. Since the equilibrium here assumes that Conditions
(1) − (3) must hold, it leads to higher pro￿ts for the two ￿rms. On the
other hand, if V is ￿xed, then the pro￿ts shrink at t increases. This is easily
veri￿able if we use the intuition from the problem where ￿rms are located
at the same place and compete only in prices. Recall that the optimal pro￿t









,w h e r e
V is the ￿xed reservation price. Thus pro￿ts tend to zero as t increases.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a model where both ￿rms and consumers have trans-
portation costs. In the standard mill pricing model the pure strategy equi-
librium breaks down since ￿rms have an incentive to move to the center
and this makes it easier for the rival to undercut. The ￿rm that undercuts
successfully gains the entire market. In our model while choosing locations
the ￿rms also have to ensure that they minimize their of transport cost bill.
So, while there is a central location tendency, in our model there is also a
countervailing force. The ￿rm that undercuts its rival may not be able to
sell to the entire market. Similarly, note that in the uniform delivery price
models one ￿rm may charge a high price and sell to customers who its rival
may be unwilling to service. In our model the ￿rationed￿ consumers may
be not be willing to buy from a high price ￿rm since the price inclusive of
transport costs may exceed their reservation price. However, by imposing
13Hotelling￿s remark in this context is especially interesting. ￿These particular mer-
chants would do well, instead of organizing improvement clubs and booster associations
to better the roads, to make transportation as diﬃcult as possible. Still better would be
their situation if they could obtain a protective tariﬀ to hinder the transportation of their
commodity between them.￿ (pg. 51) Thus Hotelling￿s intuition seems to be incomplete as
the eﬀect of the reservation price of the consumers is not taken into account.
20a set of simple requirements and invoking two lemmas, we are able to rule
out such possibilities in the location-price game. Under certain parameter
values on the transport cost share, we ￿nd a unique symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium where ￿rms do not locate at the city center. This result diﬀers
from the earlier results on location games and is clearly a consequence of
requiring both types of players to incur transport costs.
We also solve two other games to develop some insights for the two-stage
game. In the ￿rst of these we consider parametric prices, thereby restricting
￿rms to choosing a location only. We ￿nd that when the share of transport
costs borne by the consumers increase ￿rms move closer to the center. An
interesting feature of the model is that there is a symmetric location equi-
librium where the ￿rms chose their location keeping their transport cost in
mind. It means that the ￿rms would never locate at the end points. In fact
there is a threshold location ( l
4)w h i c ht h e￿rms will never cross. In the
second game ￿rms are assumed to locate at the same spot. Thus location
choice is no longer an element of the strategy space. Here we ￿nd the ex-
istence of a mixed strategy equilibrium whose support is identi￿ed in the
paper. This is useful since the existence problem is resolved indicating that
the two stage game would at least have a mixed strategy equilibrium. This
game also revealed that when the ￿rms locate too close to each other there
cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e., the incentive to undercut is
too strong. The importance of the reservation price was also demonstrated
by the this game. Another interesting feature of this price game is the pos-
sibility of discriminatory rationing. These key insights were valuable for
￿nding the pure strategy equilibrium of the two-stage game.
Finally, the paper also raises another interesting question − the issue of
endogenizing the transport cost sharing decision. We believe that this will
provide an alternative approach to modeling the choice between uniform
delivery pricing or mill pricing for ￿rms.
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23Appendix:
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : The location of the consumer who is indif-
ferent between buying from A and buying from B simpli￿es to z = l−b+a
2 .
Then we can write the pro￿t function as Π1(a,b)=pz−
(1−α)t
2 {a2+(z−a)2},
and Π2(a,b)=p(l − z) −
(1−α)t
2 {b2 +( l − b − z)2}.I ne a c ho ft h e s ep r o ￿t
functions the ￿rst term denotes revenues and the second term is the share of
the transport cost. Geometrically, total costs are triangles whose areas the
￿rms try to minimize. The proof consists of taking the derivative of each
￿rm￿s pro￿t function with respect to its location and solving the following

















We also verify that the second order conditions are satis￿ed. Substituting
the optimal locations in the pro￿t functions yields the equilibrium pro￿ts.
Furthermore, we can check that ￿rm A does not wish to locate to the right
of ￿rm B.G i v e nb∗, we know that l − b∗ is less than l
2 which denotes the
location of the indiﬀerent consumer in the above equilibrium. Consequently,
in the above equilibrium ￿rm A has half the market. If ￿rm A locates to
the right of ￿rm B then the new indiﬀerent consumer will lie in the interval
l−b∗ and ￿rm A￿s market area will be strictly less than half the market area
l
2. Hence, ￿rm A will not gain by selecting a location to the right of ￿rm
B.B ys y m m e t r y ,￿rm B will never locate to the left of ￿rm A.S o ,( a∗, b∗)
constitutes an equilibrium.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : We demonstrate that the interval [pl,p u] ⊂ [0,V]
for each of the two possible cases. We show that when ￿rm A raises its price
starting from zero, ￿rm B will not raise its price beyond pu. Similarly, ￿rm
A will not reduce its price below a lower bound pl. Case (I): For V<b V ,
pu
r is the candidate upper bound. By de￿nition, we know that pu
r dominates
all prices in the interval (pu,V]. When ￿rm A raises its price beyond zero,
￿rm B loses customers from the center of its market. The optimal response
for ￿rm B is to either lower its price and sell to the consumers previously
left out, or to undercut ￿rm A. Thus prices do not exceed pu
r. Case (II):
For V ≥ b V,the candidate upper bound is pu
a.W h e n￿rm A raises its prices,
￿rm B can continue to sell to the residual market at pu
a, or undercut ￿rm
A. Thus in either case there is an upper bound on prices. Now consider the
24existence of the associated lower bounds for the two possible cases. Case
(III):L e tV<b V .S i n c e ￿rm A￿s pro￿ts are increasing in its price, it will
prefer to raise its price. The lower bound on prices can be obtained by
equating Π2(p1,p 0
2(p1)) (where p0
2(p1)i s￿rm B￿s best response) with ￿rm
A￿s pro￿t when it raises price. Prices in the range [0,p l
r) are dominated by
pl
r and for prices above pl
r,t h er i v a l￿rm will have an incentive to undercut.
Case (IV):F o rV ≥ b V,the candidate lower bound is pl
a.As i m i l a ra r g u m e n t
establishes the lower bound on prices for this case. Thus prices will not fall
below pl. This allows us to conclude that prices above pu are dominated by
it. Also, choosing pl yields higher pro￿ts than prices below it. So there can-
not be a pure strategy equilibrium outside this interval. Hence there cannot
be one in mixed strategies either as it would involve the play of dominated
strategies.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : From Lemma 1 we know that any equilibrium
must lie in the interval [pl,p u]. Assuming a = l
2 we will now compute
the critical V and the two associated intervals. The threshold V is found
by taking the derivative of ￿rm B￿s pro￿t function at the price when the
furthest consumer is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying from ￿rm
B and occurs at p = V − (t − s) l
2. For V<l
2(2t − s)=b V , the upper
bound is the monopoly solution. When ￿rm B behaves as a monopolist on





















∂p1 < 0. For the lower




2s.S i n c e￿rm A is the low price ￿rm, its pro￿t expression does








. The root with the positive discriminant yields a negative p2
and hence is eliminated. The optimal value of p1 which is the lower bound














This is intuitive: a high p1 implies that the low-price ￿rm is selling to a
large section of consumers leaving out very little for the other ￿rm. To ￿nd
the upper bound we use the root with the negative discriminant and it can
be checked that pu
r >p l
r. Also, using these prices we ￿nd that pro￿ts are










Let V ≥ l
2(2t − s)=b V . A similar argument establishes the lower
bound on prices for this case. The only diﬀerence is that the monopoly
pro￿to f￿rm B is now diﬀerent. So, pu








. Now let us consider what happens when prices
are in the range [pl,p u]. Suppose a ￿rm is charging the price pu.T h e nb y
c h a r g i n gap r i c epu − ε (where ε > 0, and small) its rival can undercut the
￿rm completely. This phenomenon of successive undercutting will occur for
any price above pl. Once prices reach pl, one of the ￿rms is better oﬀ sell-
i n gt ot h er e m a i n i n gc o n s u m e r sa tap r i c eo fph instead of undercutting its
rival further. However, the ￿rm charging pl would now prefer to undercut
the high price ￿rm. Hence there are no pure strategy equilibria. Finally,
it can be shown that the two stage location-price game satis￿es Theorem 5
of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, pg. 14). Hence it is satis￿ed for this price
subgame. Hence we assert that a mixed strategy equilibrium identi￿ed here
exists.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : This is a non-existence result that proves the ne-
cessity of the Seller Participation condition. Case (i) p1 − as < 0. Here
￿rm A has market loss on its left hand side. Also assume that α > 1 − α.
Then it is easy to check that by charging a price p1 + ε (ε > 0), ￿rm A
can increase its pro￿ts. Suppose α ≤ 1 − α as shown in Figure 4.T h e n
t h e r ee x i s t sap r i c ep a i r( p1,p 2) which is an equilibrium in pure strategies.
However, it is not robust to the ￿rm￿s location choice decision. It is easy
to check that ￿rm A can always do better by moving to its left. Since we
require conditions for an equilibrium in the two stage game, any candidate
equilibrium must survive the next stage of subgame perfection − the choice
of optimal locations. Note that the tendency to move to the left for ￿rm
A is present irrespective of the relationship between α and 1 − α. Hence it
is not possible for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist in this case. Case
(ii) p1 − (z − a)s<0. Firm A now has market loss from the right hand
side. One can check that by charging a price p1 + ε, ￿rm A is better oﬀ.I t
gains market share and sells at a higher price. Case (iii) p1 − as < 0, and
p1 − (z − a)s<0. Here ￿rm A is losing market areas on both sides. By
raising its price ￿rm A will increase market areas on both sides, and sell to
all customers at the higher price eventually leading to one of the two situa-
tions described above. The second part of Condition 2 consists of symmetric
conditions for ￿rm B.
26P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : Suppose that (p1,p 2) is an equilibrium but |p1 − p2| >
(t − s)(l − b − a). Then there are two possibilities. First let p2 − as ≥ 0.
Here the high price ￿rm has no market area and will lower its price down to
(at least) the delivered price of the opponent at its own location, ensuring
ap o s i t i v ep r o ￿t. Hence this case cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Next
let p2 − as < 0. Here the high price ￿rm has some residual market area. If
this ￿rm does not alter its location then a mixed strategy equilibrium (as in
Section 5) is the only possibility. Alternatively, the ￿rm can move inwards
to make greater pro￿ts. Thus there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Finally,
let p2 − p1 =( t − s)(l − b − a) where the modulus has been ignored for the
sake of simplicity. If p1 =0 ,t h e n￿rm A can gain by charging a price less
than p2 +( t − s)(l − b − a). If p1 > 0, given the general form of our pro￿t
function ￿rm A can sell to buyers up to the location of ￿rm B.S o￿rm A can
reduce its price slightly and increase its market share making larger pro￿ts.
Alternatively if at p1 > 0a n d￿rm A was not selling to all the customers
up to ￿rm B￿s location, it can increase pro￿ts by raising prices. Hence for
price equilibrium we need that |p1 − p2| < (t − s)(l − b − a).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : We know from Lemma 2 and 3 that if any
of the conditions are not satis￿ed then a pure strategy equilibrium does not
exist. So assuming Conditions (1) − (3) are satis￿ed, we have well behaved
pro￿t functions in this range given by Π1 = p1z − s
2(2a2 + z2 − 2az)a n d
Π2 = p2(l − z) − s
2(b2 +( l − b)2 + z2 − 2(l − b)z). Assuming ￿xed locations









4s2b +2 ls2 + sat − 7stb +2 t2b − 7slt +6 lt2 − 2at2
3t − 2s
Substituting these in the pro￿t function we obtain the optimal locations
stated in the proposition. Note that in order to satisfy a∗ ≤ l
2 we need
s>0.32195t. These are substituted back into the price equations to obtain






(3t−2s)2 . While it is quite
cumbersome due to the higher order polynomials involved in the pro￿te x -
pression, we verify that pro￿ts are almost always positive through graphical
analysis. The expression for optimal pro￿ts is positive for all s>0.0575t.
Hence (a∗,b ∗,p ∗
1,p ∗
2) is the unique equilibrium.
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